Lisa Bortolotti: Articles

Articles by topic and listed from the most recent to the oldest. Links are provided to open access publications.

Editorials

L Bortolotti, L Chiu and L Saling (2023). A Journey into the Mind. Philosophical Psychology 36 (4), 701-3.
L Bortolotti (2023). Challenges and Achievements for Philosophical Psychology Philosophical Psychology 36 (1), 1-3.
L Bortolotti (2022). A New Philosophical Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 35 (1), 1-5.

The Philosophy Garden papers

L Bortolotti (forthcoming). Using Explainer Videos to Do Philosophy with Children and Young People. Journal of Philosophy in Schools.
L Bortolotti and A Ichino (2024). Understanding conspiracy theories with Fake Plots. APA blog (Professor Reflection series), September 25th.
A Ichino, F Zambra, L Bortolotti, P Ceravolo and D Tarantola (2024). Fake Plots: un juego para ‘vacunar’ a los jóvenes contra la desinformación y las teorías de la conspiración. Pensar Juntos, vol. 8, 1-19.

Clinical Delusions

L Bortolotti (2024). Revisiting delusions to demystify human agency: a response to critics. Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 5.
L Bortolotti (2024). Understanding delusions to improve our mutual interactions: a precis of Why Delusions Matter. Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 5.
F Zambra and L Bortolotti (forthcoming). Criterios epistémicos para la atribución de creencias delirantes. Análisis Filosófico.
L Bortolotti (2022). Are delusions pathological beliefs? Asian Journal of Philosophy 1, 31. DOI 10.1007/s44204-022-00033-3.
L Bortolotti and M Belvederi Murri (2021). Can there be delusions of pain? Rivista internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 12 (2), 167-172.
R Ritunnano and L Bortolotti (2021). Do delusions have and give meaning? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. DOI 10.1007/s11097-021-09764-9
E Lancellotta and L Bortolotti (2020). Delusions in the two-factor theory: pathological or adaptive? European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 16 (2), 37-57.
L Bortolotti (2020). Doctors without disorders. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 94 (1), 163–184.
E Lancellotta and L Bortolotti (2019). Are delusions adaptive? WIREs in the Cognitive Sciences 10 (5), e1502.
M Broome and L Bortolotti (2018). Affective instability and paranoia. Discipline Filosofiche XXVIII (2), 123-136.
R Gunn and L Bortolotti (2018). Can delusions play a protective role? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (4), 813-833. DOI 10.1007/s11097-017-9555-6
M Antrobus and L Bortolotti (2016). Depressive delusions. Filosofia Unisinos 17 (2), 192-201. DOI 10.4013/fsu.2016.172.14.
L Bortolotti and K Miyazono (2016). The ethics of delusional belief. Erkenntnis 81 (2), 275-296. DOI 10.1007/s10670-015-9739-9.
L Bortolotti (2016). The epistemic benefits of elaborated and systematised delusions in schizophrenia. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (3), 879-900. DOI 10.1093/bjps/axv024.
L Bortolotti (2015). The epistemic innocence of motivated delusions. Consciousness & Cognition 33, 490-499.
K Miyazono and L Bortolotti (2015). The causal role argument against doxasticism about delusions. Avant V (3), 30-50.
L Bortolotti and K Miyazono (2015). Recent work on the nature and the development of delusions. Philosophy Compass 10 (9), 636-645. DOI 10.1111/phc3.12249.
L Bortolotti and K Miyazono (2015). Are alien thoughts beliefs? (Commentary on Jordi Fernandez’s Transparent Minds). Teorema 34 (1), 135-148.
L Bortolotti, M Broome and M Mameli (2014). Delusions and Responsibility for Action: Insights from the Breivik case. Neuroethics 7 (3), 377-382. DOI 10.1007/s12152-013-9198-4.
L Bortolotti and M Broome (2012). Affective dimensions of the phenomenon of double bookkeeping in delusions. Emotion Review 4 (2), 187-191.
L Bortolotti (2012). Précis of Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs. Neuroethics 5 (1), 1-4.
L Bortolotti (2012). In defence of modest doxasticism about delusions. Neuroethics 5 (1), 39-53.
L Bortolotti and M Mameli (2012). Self-deception, delusion and the boundaries of folk psychology. Humana.Mente 20, 203–221.
L Bortolotti, R Cox and A Barnier (2012). Can we recreate delusions in the laboratory? Philosophical Psychology 25 (1), 109-131.
L Bortolotti (2011). Psychiatric classification and diagnosis. Delusions and confabulations. Paradigmi XXXIX (1), 99-112.
L Bortolotti (2011). Shaking the bedrock. Philosophy Psychiatry and Psychology 18 (1), 77-87.
M Broome, M Mameli and L Bortolotti (2010). Moral responsibility and mental illness: a case study. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 19 (2), 179-187.
L Bortolotti and M Broome (2009). A role for ownership and authorship of thoughts in the analysis of thought insertion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2), 205-224.
L Bortolotti and M Broome (2008). Delusional beliefs and reason giving. Philosophical Psychology 21 (6), 801-821.
L Bortolotti and M Broome (2007). If you didn't care, you wouldn't notice: recognition and estrangement in psychopathology. Philosophy Psychiatry and Psychology 14 (1), 39-42.
L Bortolotti (2005). Delusions and the background of rationality. Mind & Language 20 (2), 189-208.

Epistemic Agency and Epistemic Injustice

L Bortolotti (2024). Experience and expertise [Esperienza e competenza]. Rivista di filosofia CXV, 2, 303-318. DOI: 10.1413/114469.
C Bergen, L Bortolotti, R Temple, C Fadashe, C Lee, M Lim, R McCabe (2023). Implying implausibility and undermining versus accepting peoples’ experiences of suicidal ideation and self-harm in Emergency Department psychosocial assessments. Frontiers in Psychiatry 14 URL=https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyt.2023.1197512
L Bortolotti and K Murphy-Hollies (2023). Why We Should Be Curious about Each Other. Philosophies 8 (4):71.
L Bortolotti (2023). How to avoid epistemic injustice in healthcare: the case of youth mental health emergency services in the UK. MEFISTO. Journal of Medicine, Philosophy, and History 7 (1), 9-26.
C Bergen, L Bortolotti, K Tallent, et al. (2022). Communication in youth mental health clinical encounters: Introducing the agential stance. Theory & Psychology 32 (5), 667-690.
C Bamboulis and L Bortolotti (2022). The Epistemic Relevance of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 29 (2), 91-93.
J Houlders, L Bortolotti and M Broome (2021). Threats to Epistemic Agency in Young People with Unusual Experiences and Beliefs. Synthese 199, 7689–7704.
V Motta and L Bortolotti (2020). Solitude as a positive experience: empowerment and agency. Metodo. International Studies in Phenomenology 8 (2), 119-147.
L Bortolotti (2018). Optimism, agency, and success. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (3), 521-535.
A Jefferson and L Bortolotti (2018). Why (some) unrealistic optimism is permissible in patient decision making. American Journal of Bioethics 18 (9), 27-29.
A Jefferson and L Bortolotti (2018). What aspects of good practice in early interventions in psychosis can be codified in guidelines? – A commentary on Corsico et al. Child and Adolescent Mental Health 23 (3), 194-5.
L Bortolotti (2017). Last Word: Optimism. RSA Journal 2, 50.
L Bortolotti and A Jefferson (2016). Moral preferences. Society 53 (3), 269-272.
A Jefferson, L Bortolotti and B Kuzmanovic (2017). What is unrealistic optimism? Consciousness & Cognition 50, 3-11.
L Bortolotti and M Antrobus (2015). Costs and benefits of realism and optimism. Current Opinion in Psychiatry 28 (2), 194-198.

Stories, Confabulations, and Conspiracies

L. Bortolotti (2023). Are conspiracy beliefs epistemically innocent? Philosophical Topics.
L Bortolotti (2023). Is it pathological to believe conspiracy theories? Transcultural Psychiatry. doi:10.1177/13634615231187243
L Bortolotti (2022). Sharing responsibility for conspiracy beliefs: The agency-in-context model. Resistances 3 (6), e210103.
L Bortolotti and K Murphy-Hollies (2022). Exceptionalism at the time of COVID-19: where nationalism meets irrationality. Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 55, 90-111.
L Bortolotti, A Ichino, M Mameli (2021). Conspiracy theories and delusions. Reti, Saperi e Linguaggi 2, 183-200.
A Ichino and L Bortolotti (2021). Complottismi, negazionismi, e altre distorsioni cognitive: una sfida all'incrocio ta psicologia e filosofia. (Conspiracy theories, denialisms, and other cognitive distortions: a challenge at the intersection of psychology and philosophy). Syzetesis VIII, 143-162.
K Murphy-Hollies and L Bortolotti (2021). Stories as Evidence. Memory, Mind & Media 1, E3. doi:10.1017/mem.2021.5
S Stammers and L Bortolotti (2020). Introduction: Philosophical Perspectives on Confabulation. Topoi 39, 115–119.
L Bortolotti and A Jefferson (2019). The Power of Stories: Responsibility for the use of autobiographical stories in mental health debates. Diametros 60, 18–33.
L Bortolotti and E Sullivan-Bissett (2019). Is choice blindness a case of self-ignorance? Synthese 198, 5437–5454.
K Puddifoot and L Bortolotti (2019). Epistemic innocence and the production of false memory beliefs. Phil Studies 176 (3), 755-780.
L Bortolotti and E Sullivan-Bissett (2018). Epistemic innocence of clinical memory distortions. Mind & Language 33 (3), 263-279.
L Bortolotti (2018). Stranger than fiction: Costs and benefits of everyday confabulation. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (2), 227-249.
L Bortolotti (2011). Psychiatric classification and diagnosis. Delusions and confabulations. Paradigmi XXXIX (1), 99-112.
L Bortolotti (2009). The epistemic benefits of reason giving. Theory & Psychology 19 (5), 1-22.
L Bortolotti and R Cox (2009). 'Faultless ignorance': strengths and limitations of epistemic definitions of confabulation. Consciousness & Cognition 18 (4), 952-965.

Belief and Irrationality

K Murphy-Hollies and L Bortolotti (2022). The Agency-First Epistemology of Psychedelics. Philosophy and the Mind Sciences vol. 3.
A Polonioli, S Stammers, L Bortolotti (2018). ‘Good’ Biases: Does doxastic irrationality benefit both individuals and groups? Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger 143 (3), 327-344.
L Bortolotti and E Sullivan-Bissett (2017). How can false and irrational beliefs be useful? Philosophical Explorations 20, S1-S3.
L Bortolotti and E Sullivan-Bissett (2015). Costs and benefits of imperfect cognitions. Consciousness & Cognition 33, 487-489.
L Bortolotti (2008). What does Fido believe? Think 7 (19), 1-9.
L Bortolotti (2005). Intentionality without rationality. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society CV (3), 385-392.
L Bortolotti (2004). Can we interpret irrational behavior? Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2), 359-375.
L Bortolotti (2003). Inconsistency and interpretation. Philosophical Explorations VI (2), 109-123.

Ethics, Bioethics, and Medical Ethics

L Bortolotti (2013). The relative importance of undesirable truths. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 16 (4), 683-690.
L Bortolotti (2011). Does reflection lead to wise choices? Philosophical Explorations 14 (3), 297-313.
A Wright and L Bortolotti (2011). Introduction. Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (9-10), 6-18 (special issue on 'Pain and the Experience of Pain: Theoretical Models and Practical Implications').
A Blasimme and L Bortolotti (2010). Intentionality and the welfare of minded non-humans. Teorema XXIX (2), 83-96.
L Bortolotti (2010). Agency, life extension, and the meaning of life. The Monist 93(1), 38-56. PDF.
L Bortolotti and Y Nagasawa (2009). Immortality without boredom. Ratio XXII (3), 261-277.
D Cutas and L Bortolotti (2010). Natural versus assisted reproduction. In search of fairness. Studies in Ethics, Law and Technology 4 (1), 1-18.
L Bortolotti and D Cutas (2009). Reproductive and parental autonomy: an argument for compulsory parental education. Reproductive Biomedicine Online 19 (1st July), 5-14. PDF.
L Bortolotti and B Heinrichs (2007). Delimiting the concept of research: an ethical perspective. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 28 (3), 157-179.
S Holm and L Bortolotti (2007). Large scale survey for policy formation and research - a study in inconsistency. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 28 (3), 205-220.
L Bortolotti (2007). Disputes over moral status: philosophy and science in the future of bioethics. Health Care Analysis 15 (2), 153-158.
L Bortolotti and M Mameli (2006). Deception in psychology: moral costs and benefits of unsought self-knowledge. Accountability in Research 13 (3), 259-275.
M Mameli and L Bortolotti (2006). Animal rights, animal minds and human mindreading. Journal of Medical Ethics 32, 84-89.
S Camporesi and L Bortolotti (2008). Reproductive cloning in humans and therapeutic cloning in primates: is the ethical debate catching up with the recent scientific advances? Journal of Medical Ethics 34 (9), e15.
L Bortolotti (2006). Moral rights and human culture. Ethical Perspectives 13 (4), 603-622.
L Bortolotti and J Harris (2006). Embryos and eagles: symbolic value in research and reproduction. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 15 (1), 22-34.
J Harris, L Irving and L Bortolotti (2005). An ethical framework for stem cell research in the European Union. Health Care Analysis 13 (3), 157-162.
L Bortolotti and J Harris (2005). Stem cell research, personhood and sentience. Reproductive Biomedicine Online 10 (1), 68-75.

Philosophy and Ethics of Psychiatry

R Ambríz González and L Bortolotti (2023). Putting scientific realism into perspective. Interdisciplinary Science Reviews 48 (2), 299-310.
L Grassi, F Folesani, M Marella, E Tiberto, MB Riba, L Bortolotti, T Toffanin, L Palagini, M Belvederi Murri, B Biancosino, M Ferrara, R Caruso (2022). Debating Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Death in People with Psychiatric Disorders. Current Psychiatry Reports 24(6):325-335.
R Ambríz González and L Bortolotti (2021). The appeal and challenges of an integrative approach to psychiatry. Brazilian Journal of Psychiatry.
B Fulford, L Bortolotti and M Broome (2014). Taking the Long View: an Emerging Framework for Translational Psychiatric Science. World Psychiatry 13 (2), 110-117.
L Bortolotti and H Widdows (2011). The right not to know: the case of psychiatric disorders. Journal of Medical Ethics 37, 673-676.
L Bortolotti and L Malatesti (2010). Conceptual challenges in the characterisation and explanation of psychiatric phenomena. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 6 (1), 5-10 (special issue on 'Classification and Explanation in Psychiatry: Philosophical Issues').
M Broome and L Bortolotti (2010). What's wrong with 'mental' disorders? Commentary on D Stein et al.'s "What is a Mental/Psychiatric Disorder? From DSM-IV to DSM-V". Psychological Medicine 40 (11): 1783 -1785.
M Broome and L Bortolotti (2009). Mental illness as mental: In defence of psychological realism. Humana.Mente 11, 25-44.