- R McCabe and L Bortolotti (forthcoming). How (not) to talk to people about mental health: Validating distress and avoiding blame. In E Harcourt (ed.) Madness and Mental Health.
- K Murphy-Hollies, L Bortolotti, and M Mameli (forthcoming). Le renard et la chouette: confabulation, complots et régulation de soi. In D. Simonin (ed.) Les Fables de l'homme: pouvoirs de la fabulation. Kimé.
- M Larkin et al. (2025). Being Understood: Epistemic Injustice Towards Young People Seeking Support for Their Mental Health. In: Bortolotti, L. (eds) Epistemic Justice in Mental Healthcare. Palgrave Macmillan.
- L. Bortolotti et al. (2025). Challenging Stereotypes About Young People Who Hear Voices. In: Bortolotti, L. (eds) Epistemic Justice in Mental Healthcare. Palgrave Macmillan.
- L Bortolotti and M Belvederi Murri (2025). Delusion and Adaptiveness. In E Sullivan-Bissett (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Delusions. Routledge, chapter 3.
- M Larkin, L Bortolotti and M Lim (2024). Expertise as perspectives in dialogue. In M Farina, A Lavazza and D Pritchard (eds.), Expertise: Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press, chapter 5.
- L Grassi and L Bortolotti (2024). Delusions across and beyond diagnoses. In A Falcato and J Gonçalves (eds.) The Philosophy and Psychology of Delusions: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives. Routledge, chapter 11.
- A Jefferson and L Bortolotti (2023). On the moral psychology of the pandemic agent. In E. Barbosa (ed.) Moral Challenges in a Pandemic Age. Routledge, chapter 2.
- R Ambriz Gonzalez and L Bortolotti (2023). Realismo / antirealismo e psichiatria. In R Campaner and C Gabbani (eds.) Realismo e Antirealismo nelle Scienze. Carocci, chapter 6.
- E Vintiadis and L Bortolotti (2022). The role of context in belief evaluation. In J Musolino et al. (eds.) The Cognitive Science of Belief. Cambridge University Press, chapter 4.
- A Polonioli and L Bortolotti (2021). The Social and Epistemic Benefits of Polite Conversations. In Chaoqun Xie (ed.) The Philosophy of (Im)politeness. Springer, 55-71
- L Bortolotti and M Aliffi (2021). The epistemic benefits of irrational boredom. In A Elpidorou (ed.) The Moral Psychology of Boredom. Rowman & Littlefield.
- L Bortolotti and S Stammers (2020). When the Personal Becomes Political: How Do We Fulfil Our Epistemic Duties Relative to the Use of Autobiographical Stories in Public Debates? In S Stapleford and K McCain (eds.) Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge, chapter 16.
- L Bortolotti and S Stammers (2020). Philosophy as a means of empowerment. In E Vintiadis (ed.) Philosophy by Women: 22 Philosophers Reflect on Philosophy and Its Value. Routledge, chapter 1.
- L Bortolotti, E Sullivan-Bissett and M Antrobus (2019). The epistemic innocence of optimistically biased beliefs. In M Balcerak Jackson and B Balcerak Jackson (eds.) Reasoning: Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking. Oxford University Press, chapter 12.
- L Bortolotti and K Puddifoot (2019). Philosophy, bias, and stigma. In D Bubbio and J Malpas (eds.) Why Philosophy? De Gruyter, 51-64.
- F Bongiorno and L Bortolotti (2019). The role of unconscious inference in models of delusion formation. In A Nes and T Chan (eds.) Inference and Consciousness. Routledge, chapter 3.
- L Bortolotti (2018). Delusions and three myths of irrational belief. In L Bortolotti (ed.) Delusions in Context. Palgrave Pivot. Open access book.
- L Bortolotti (2018). Agency without Rationality. In A Coliva, P Leonardi, S Moruzzi (eds.) Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History. Palgrave Macmillan, 265-280.
- E Sullivan-Bissett and L Bortolotti (2017). Fictional persuasion, transparency, and the aim of belief: reviving the teleologist’s dilemma. In E Sullivan-Bissett et al. (eds.) Art and Belief. Oxford University Press, chapter 9.
- L Bortolotti and R Gunn (2017). Delusion. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online.
- L Bortolotti, R Gunn and E Sullivan-Bissett (2017). What makes a belief delusional? In I Mac Carthy, K Sellevold and O Smith (eds.) Cognitive Confusions: Dreams, Delusions and Illusions in Early Modern Culture. Legenda, chapter 3.
- E Sullivan-Bissett, L Bortolotti, M Broome and M Mameli (2016). Moral and legal implications of the continuity between delusional and non-delusional beliefs. In G Keil, L Keuck and R Hauswald (eds.) Vagueness in Psychiatry. Oxford University Press, chapter 10.
- K Miyazono, L Bortolotti and M Broome (2014). Prediction-error and two-factor theories of delusion formation: competitors or allies? In N Galbraith (ed.) Aberrant Beliefs and Reasoning. Psychology Press, 34-54.
- J Craigie and L Bortolotti (2014). Rationality, Diagnosis, and Patient Autonomy in Psychiatry. In J Z Sadler, B Fulford, C W van Staden (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Psychiatric Ethics, vol. 1. Oxford University Press.
- L Bortolotti (2013). Rationality and Sanity. In KWM Fulford et al. (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. Oxford University Press.
- L Bortolotti, R Cox, M Broome and M Mameli (2012). Rationality and self-knowledge in delusions and confabulations: implications for autonomy as self-governance. In L Radoilska (ed.) Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press, chapter 5, 100-122.
- L Bortolotti (2010). Double bookkeeping in delusions: explaining the gap between saying and doing. In K Frankish, A Buckareff and J Aguilar (eds.) New Waves in the Philosophy of Action. Palgrave, chapter 11.
- L Bortolotti (2009). Delusion. In E Zalta (ed.) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Revised and updated in September 2018 and May 2022.
- L Bortolotti (2002). Marks of Irrationality. In T Lyons and S Clarke (eds.) Recent Themes in the Philosophy of Science. Kluwer, 157-174.