Monographs



Why Delusions Matter

The book was published in August 2023 with Bloomsbury.
Here is symposium on the book, published in October 2024 in Philosophy of the Mind Sciences (open access).




When we talk about delusions we may refer to symptoms of mental health problems, such as clinical delusions in schizophrenia, or simply the beliefs that people cling to which are implausible and resistant to counterevidence; these can include anything from beliefs about the benefits of homeopathy to concerns about the threat of alien abduction.

Why do people adopt delusional beliefs and why are they so reluctant to part with them? In the book I argue that, despite their negative reputation, delusions can also play a positive role in people's lives, imposing some meaning on adverse experiences and strengthening personal or social identities. 




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The Epistemic Innocence of Irrational Beliefs

This research monograph, published in June 2020 by Oxford University Press, offers an overview of research conducted during three externally-funded projects, The Epistemic Innocence of Imperfect Cognitions (AHRC) (2013-2014), PERFECT (ERC) (2014-2019), and Costs and Benefits of Optimism (Templeton) (2015-2016).

Epistemic innocence of irrational beliefs book cover


In The Epistemic Innocence of Irrational Beliefs I propose a new framework for the assessment of beliefs that are not supported by or responsive to evidence and yet are instrumental to our capacity to overcome crises and sustain our motivation as agents. My hope is to develop the conceptual resources for a more nuanced and sophisticated account of epistemic evaluation for beliefs, acknowledging that some beliefs can be at the same time irrational and epistemically valuable.

There is a virtual book launch for the monograph, featuring Kengo Miyazono, Elly Vintiadis, Keith Frankish, Anna Ichino, Chris Letheby, and Anne Meylan. Each philosopher discusses one aspect of the book in a video presentation freely available on YouTube.




I was interviewed on the book by Robert Talisse for the New Books in Philosophy podcast. I have also written a series of posts on the book for the Brains blog (October 2020) where I respond to some of the comments received during the virtual book launch.

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Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs

Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs (International Perspectives in Philosophy & Psychiatry) was published by Oxford University Press in November 2009.

It was awarded the American Philosophical Association Book Prize in 2011.


Cover of book, Delusions and other irrational beliefs


In the book I attempt to show that the arguments against the doxastic conception of delusions are misleading when they are based on an idealised notion of belief, and I present many examples of irrationality in paradigmatic cases of belief. As a result, I maintain that we should give up (once and for all) the assumption that belief ascription is hostage to the satisfaction of norms of rationality.
A symposium on the book appeared in a special issue of Neuroethics (2012).

An interview about the book conducted by Raj Persaud is available here: Are delusions that irrational?

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